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Abstract
Drawing upon preceding empirical studies on the potential endogeneity of both debt and
dividends in developed markets, this study investigates two-way causal relationships that can
exist between payout decisions and debt policies in Malaysian listed companies. The analysis is
performed by applying a simultaneous equations model (SEM) on a sample of 267 listed firms
on the Main board of Bursa Malaysia during 2006–2014. The main findings indicate that when
dividend is treated as endogenous, there is a positive impact on leverage. However, leverage is
found to have a simultaneous negative impact on dividends. The findings also show that liquidity
and performance positively affect dividends, although they have a negative effect on leverage.
Additionally, this study documents an inverse relation between tangibility and debt, a direct
relation between reputation and debt, and also confirms that larger firms tend to pay out a higher
percentage of dividends per share.
JEL Classification: G35.
Keywords: Agency Theory, Bursa Malaysia, Dividends, Endogeneity, Leverage, Simultaneous
Equations Models.
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INTRODUCTION:
Numerous studies in economics and finance have examined the determinants of dividends (Denis
& Osobov, 2008; Miller & Rock, 1985) and debt policy (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal, 2006;
Bolton & Scharfstein, 1996), separately. However, in the academic literature it is established that
debt and dividends are interrelated (Faulkender, Milbourn, & Thakor, 2006; Kim Ph, Rhim, &
Friesner, 2007). Additionally, based on the agency theory, Jensen et al. (1992) argued that there
are both direct and indirect relationships between dividend and leverage policies. This
interrelation is obviously due to the fact that the dividend payment determines retention and
hence the capital structure (Aggarwal & Kyaw, 2010). Capital structure policies have the
underlying aim of maximizing the value of a firm (Ross, 1977). Jensen and Meckling (1976) also
mentioned that based on the agency cost, the optimal capital structure will be determined by
minimizing the cost that arises from the conflict between the two parties namely; owners and
managers. Moreover, Malaysian firms used the dividend policy to reduce the agency problems
(H. J. A. Ahmed, 2008). Additionally, dividend decisions are considered in the corporate
governance mechanism which is influenced by other instruments (Esfahani Zahiri & Jaffar,
2012).
One of the conflicts about the dividend policy in Malaysian public listed companies is related to
personal tax exemptions, where managers are reluctant to cut or avoid omitting dividends even
when the performance of the companies is deteriorating due to the shareholders’ pressure (Ling,
Abdull Mutalip, Shahrin, & Othman, 2008). In Malaysia, there is no standard procedure or
policy for governing corporate dividend payments. As such, listed firms are free to decide how
much and when during a specific financial business year to pay out dividends as long as they
comply with the firms’ Act 1965 (Section 365-1)(Chan & Devi, 2009). Given the lack of a viable
bond market, bank loans is the most important debt resource for Malaysian firms (Fraser, Zhang,
& Derashid, 2006). In addition, capital structure is very much dependent on the ownership
structure (Ebel Ezeoha & Okafor, 2010) and Malaysia is concentrated on the ownership structure
which include high percentages of family ownership (Claessens & Djankov, 1999), GLCs
ownership (Mokhtar, 2005), and managerial ownership (Mustapha, Ismail, & Minai, 2011). The
purpose of this research is to shed some light on the interrelationship between payout policy and
debt decision in the Main market of Bursa Malaysia. To the best of the authors' knowledge, it is
the first study that investigates the two-way causal relationship between debt and dividend policy
in the Malaysian context. Besides, the main results support the simultaneous mutual relations
between debt and dividend policy in the Malaysian market. The rest of the research is
categorized as follows: section 2 reviews related literature, section 3 explains data collection
procedures and relevant methodology, section 4 discusses the findings and finally, section 5
concludes the findings of this study.
LITERATURE:
This section reviews the relevant empirical and theoretical literature that depicts the studies of
interrelationship between leverage and dividends, and also the financial determinants of leverage
and dividends.
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Interrelationship between Dividends and Leverage:
Agency Theory suggests that the payment of dividends reduces the free cash flow available to
the managers and attempts to minimize the agency conflicts (Easterbrook, 1984). Moreover,
Easterbrook (1984) revealed that dividends might keep the firm in the capital market because
they could monitor managers at a lower cost. The Agency Theory also suggests that debt
mitigates shareholder-manager agency problems (H. J. A. Ahmed, 2008) by inducing lenders to
monitor reducing the free cash flow available to the managers and force managers to focus on the
value maximization when facing the threat of bankruptcy (Grossman & Hart, 1982; Zwiebel,
1996). Therefore based on the Agency Theory, dividends and leverage can be substituted to
solve the agency issue. Recently, scholars explain the agency theory based on the two
hypotheses; namely, convergence of interest and entrenchment hypotheses. Entrenched
management is a condition that managers have so much power which causes them to extract
larger perquisites and higher wages from shareholders and prefer their benefits rather than
shareholders' interest (Weisbach, 1988). Since, Malaysian managers are commonly powerful
(based on the high level of shareholding and also family connections), therefore debt and
dividends could be substitutes or complements in reducing the agency cost (M Ghasemi, Ab
Razak, & Hassan, 2015). The policies are substitutes if the convergence of interests hypothesis is
effective (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Rozeff, 1982) or complements if the entrenchment
hypothesis is effective (Persson, 2014). If the entrenchment theory is effective, shareholders
could use a combination of debt and dividends to monitor managers because managers cannot be
motivated by being offered more ownership stakes. This finding suggests that dividends should
be positively related to debts.
Meanwhile, Myers and Majluf (1984) explained that firms follow a hierarchy of financial
decisions when establishing their capital structure. In fact, the Pecking Order Theory is based on
the presence of asymmetric information between managers and outside investors and the
assumption that managers act in the interest of existing shareholders (Shen, 2014). Initially, firms
finance projects with the retained earnings first because this finance method incurs no flotation
costs and requires no disclosure of the firm’s financial information (Bevan & Danbolt, 2002). If
the retained earnings are not sufficient, the firms will go for debt (DeAngelo & DeAngelo,
2007), and if further financing is required, the last option for the firm is to issue equity.
Therefore, a higher level of dividends payout will lead to a higher level of debt to finance new
investments.
However, Brook, Charlton Jr, and Hendershott (1998) explicitly stated that there is no reason to
believe that corporate dividend policy is driven by a single goal. To answer why dividends is so
complicated, Ross, Westerfield, and Jordan (2008) argue that the important elements of
dividends are not difficult to identify but the interactions between those elements are complex
and no easy answer exists. Additionally, leverage policy is not an independent decision, but
rather simultaneously determined with other factors such as firm’s dividend policy (Crutchley,
Jensen, Jahera Jr, & Raymond, 1999). Hence, some scholars investigated the concurrent
interrelationship between leverage and dividends. For instance, Kim Ph et al. (2007) and
Faulkender et al. (2006) indicated a significant positive impact of leverage on dividends.
Furthermore, the findings of Persson (2014) disclosed a positive two-way causal relation
between total debts and dividends. Based on the finding by Vo and Nguyen (2014), however,
there is a substitution relationship between leverage and dividends in the mechanism of
controlling the agency conflicts.
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Debt Determinants:
Theoretical predictions on the effect of profitability on leverage are contradictory (Morri &
Cristanziani, 2009). Based on POT, firms prefer internal finance resources to external ones,
therefore the existence of a negative relationship between leverage and performance is
predictable(Ahmad & Aris, 2015; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Jensen (1986) predicts a positive
relationship between firm's profitability and financial leverage if the market for corporate control
is successful because debt decreases the FCF generated by profitability. A recent study by
Qureshi, Imdadullah, and Ahsen (2012) also supports this result and determines that profitability
is positive and significantly related to debt ratio. However, Affandi, Mahmood, and Shukur
(2012) mention that profitability does not have a significant contribution in the capital structure
decision in property industry in the Malaysian market.
The tangible assets of a company may be considered as the representative of the real pledges that
a company may offer to the creditors. Thus, the significance of such assets among the total assets
impresses debt level of a company. It means, increasing the warranties which are offered by the
company leads to satisfying its commitments that arise from contracted debts (Baharuddin,
Khamis, Mahmood, & Dollah, 2011; Chung, 1993). On the other hand, tangible assets provide
insignificant collateral values in developing countries because of the weak and inefficient
regulatory, legal systems, and secondary market. Consequently, an inverse relationship is also
predicted and some results obtained from different pieces of research also prove this expectation
(Mazur, 2007). Recently Maziar Ghasemi and Ab Razak (2016) studied the effect of different
liquidity ratios on different leverage ratios and the results revealed that current ratio had a
negative effect on the debt/equity and debt/asset ratios among the listed firms in Bursa Malaysia.
Liquidity has a significant effect on the conservative debt policy when the company has ample
liquid assets. Thus, liquidity policies are necessary to ignore potential risks. Therefore, the
company will follow the “pecking order style” to finance investments (Deesomsak, Paudyal, &
Pescetto, 2004; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). However, Morellec (2001) indicates when bond
covenants limit the assets' disposition, then asset liquidity increases debt capacity. An argument
for a negative relationship is debated by Myers and Rajan (1998) who argue that in the condition
of high agency costs of liquidity outside the creditors limit, the amount of debt financing is
accessible to the firm. Hence, a negative relationship between liquidity and debt may be
expected.
Older firms may establish a good reputation, so they can easily borrow at lower interest rates.
That is, the reputation of a firm may affect its leverage capability, since it reduces the conflicts
between the company and its lenders (Diamond, 1989). Empirical results suggest a direct
relationship between the age of a business and leverage (Lien, Piesse, Strange, & Filatotchev,
2005). Though, Pecking Order Theory predicts an inverse relationship between leverage and the
age of a business as older firms are relatively more stable. In addition, experienced companies
have upper internally generated funds and consequently they need less external financing
(Myers & Majluf, 1984).
Dividend Determinants
In numerous studies, performance has always been considered as a primary indicator of dividend
payout ratio (Aivazian, Booth, & Cleary, 2003; Anil & Kapoor, 2008; Ben Naceur, Goaied, &
Belanes, 2006). Based on the agency theory, shareholders expect managers of highly profitable
firms to pay higher dividends in order to reduce the agency costs (Aivazian et al., 2003; Li,
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Moshirian, Nguyen, & Tan, 2007). However, the results on the relation of dividend payout and
profitability are mixed. Some studies found negative impacts (Amidu & Abor, 2006; Kania &
Bacon, 2005), although others indicate an insignificant effect of performance on dividends
(Kato, Loewenstein, & Tsay, 2002; C. Mehta, Jain, & Yadav, 2009).
A large company is further possible to be mature and hence has an easier availability to the
capital market and could be able to pay more dividends. That is, the big size companies pay
higher dividends and smaller size companies pay fewer dividends (H. Ahmed & Javid, 2008;
Nikolaos, 2005). Also some scholars found the positive effect of the firm size on dividends in
Bursa Malaysia (Al-Twaijry, 2007; Ling et al., 2008). However, based on the findings of a study
by Breuer, Rieger, and Soypak (2014), payout policies across 29 countries show that there are
insignificant effects of the size of firms on Div/Cash, Div/EBIT, and Div/Sales.
A firm's liquidity is an important factor that affects the distribution of cash dividends. Firms with
higher cash availability, pay higher dividends than other firms with insufficient cash. This
positive relationship is supported by the signaling theory of dividend policy (Ho, 2003). In
addition, Appannan and Sim (2011) studied dividend determinants due to the listed companies in
KLSE during 2004 to 2008 and showed the positive effect of liquidity on the payout policy.
However, some empirical studies indicate that there are no significant relationship between
liquidity and profitability in some developing markets such as; Indian Information Technology
sector (Anil & Kapoor, 2008), Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange (A. Mehta, 2012), and listed
manufacturing firms in Sri Lanka Niresh (2012).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY:
Data and Sample:
The sample data consists of the firms listed on the Main market of Bursa Malaysia and covers a
nine-year period from 2006 to 2014. The data sources are OSIRIS and DATASTREAM
databases. This study concentrates on industrial products, properties industry, consumer
products, trading and services, plantation, construction, and technology sectors of the Main board
of Bursa Malaysia. This study investigates all the companies which have paid dividends
continuously and used debts in the capital structure. Moreover, companies that ceased to be
quoted in the stock market prior to 2014 and those that are listed in the Main market after 2006
are excluded from the sample. Finally, 267 firms were qualified for the inclusion in the sample
based on the continuity and accessibility of published financial statements from 2006 to 2014.
The control variables that are used for the analysis include liquidity, reputation, firm size, asset
tangibility (warrant), and firm profitability. Table 1 displays the description and measurement of
each variable.
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Table 1. Variables and Their Proxies
VARIABLE
PROXY
Dependent
Leverage
Dividends
Control
Profitability
Liquidity
Size
Reputation
Asset Tangibility

Total Debt To Total Equity Ratio
Dividends Per Share Ratio
ROE= Net Profit/ Total Equity
Current AssetsCurrent Liability
TotalAsset

Natural Logarithm of Total Asset
Number of Years Established
Tangible Assets
Total Assets

Method and Model
According to Ary, Jacobs, and Razavieh (2002), a research design represents the basic structure
of a study and serves as a guide for conducting a research. Shareholders and managers use a
combination of dividends and leverage instruments to mitigate their concerns about the agency
conflicts. Moreover, there are possibilities of the interrelation between these instruments.
Therefore a model should be used that considers the simultaneous interrelations between these
instruments. In order to fulfill the purpose of this study which is investigating the simultaneous
interrelationship between dividends and leverage, the following model is designed based on two
equations in which the dependent variables are dividends and leverage.
Dividendit   0  1 Leverageit   2 Performanceit   3 Assetit   4Current Ratioit   it
Leverage

  0   1 Dividends it   2 Performanc e it   3 Current
  4 Tangible
Asset   5 Re putation it   it

it

ratio

it

Where: i denotes the firm (cross section dimension) and t denotes time (time series dimension).
Dividends and leverage are dependent and endogenous variables and other variables are the
control variables, pooling N cross sectional observations and T time series observations.  0 and

 0 are constant terms and the intercept across cross sectional observations, and it is the error
term. Statistically, there are two methods to estimate simultaneous equation models (Green,
2003): (1) single-equation methods or limited information methods, such as 2SLS, and (2)
system methods or full information methods, such as 3SLS. Hence, to solve the above mentioned
model and find out the simultaneous interrelationship between the dependent variables, 2SLS
and 3SLS econometrics methods will be used. The 3SLS produces more efficient estimates than
2SLS if each equation does not consist of identical regressores, and also 3SLS is a more
appropriate technique for the policy investigation (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1995). Wooldridge
(2012) also proposes that the 2SLS method is more robust and consistent in the situation that the
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interest of the research is just in the special equation of a model. Moreover, Gujarati (2012)
suggests that as long as there is a great sample size and also there are no lagged endogenous
factors, 2SLS is preferred.
Generally, in order to estimate simultaneous equation systems as different estimators, using both
2SLS and 3SLS methods would be usual approaches (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Persson, 2014).To
follow a common method among scholars who studied simultaneous effects between financial
factors, dividends and leverage also will be evaluated by OLS for comparing the results of
simultaneous equations models and a simple regression will also be used in determining the
magnitude of the simultaneous bias. In other words, the comparison between simultaneous
equation models (2SLS and 3SLS) with OLS helps readers to have a better understanding of the
interrelation effects between dependent variables. For instance, Persson (2014) presents 2SLS,
3SLS, and OLS to assess the simultaneous interrelation among managerial ownership, dividend
and leverage. Drakos and Bekiris (2010) reported 2SLS, 3SLS, and OLS to compare
simultaneous effects between managerial ownership and performance. Kim Ph et al. (2007)
reported 3SLS and OLS for evaluating interrelationships among managerial ownership, dividend,
and leverage.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS:
Descriptive Statistics:
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables.
The ratio of debt to equity ranges from 0% to 404% with the average of 41.10%. These statistics
indicate that some of the sample companies are highly leveraged and some of them do not
consider debt in the capital structure. The mean value for DPS which is the dependent variable of
this study, is .066. It indicates that the average dividend payout of the firms under investigation
has been .066 ringgit (6.6 Sen). The mean of the current ratio equals to 3.402 that supports the
results of the studies in Malaysia. For instance, the findings of Maziar Ghasemi and Ab Razak
(2016)’study showed that during 2010 to 2013, the mean has been 3.31 in the Main market of
Bursa Malaysia. The average age that the firms are enlisted in Bursa Malaysia is about 14 years.
The mean of the company size equals to 13.08 and when compared with 12 from the study by
Suhaila, Mahmood, and Mansor (2008) between years 2000 to 2005, it can be inferred that the
listed companies enlarged during these years. In addition, tangible assets of listed companies in
the main market made up 32.6% of their total assets and Profitability is measured by return on
equity and has a mean value of 10.076 percent.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Observation Mean
Debt/Equity
2403
.411
DPS
2402
.066
Current Ratio
2290
3.402
ROE
2402
10.076
Ln( Total Asset)
2403
13.086
Reputation (Age)
2403
14.067

Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
.507
0
4.04
.066
0
1.4
4.283
.114
40
9.364
-40
77
1.274
10
18.081
6.222
1
30
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Tangibility

2403

.326

.192

0

.940

Table 3 displays the correlations among all the dependent and independent variables. It is
observed that all correlation coefficient values in this table are relatively low and their values are
less than 34% in 5% significant level except for the correlation between reputation and Ln (total
asset) which are in different equations. Therefore, there is no cause for being concerned about
multicollinearity among the variables.
Table 3 Pearson Correlations Matrix
Debt/Equiy

DPS

Current
Ratio

ROE

Ln
(Total
Asset)

Reputation
(Age)

Debt/Equity

1.000

DPS

-0.145**

1.000

Current Ratio

-0.333**

0.079**

1.000

ROE

-0.092**

0.366**

-0.033

1.000

0.341**

0.248**

-0.185**

0.084**

1.000

Reputation
(Age)

0.053**

0.281**

0.015

-0.074**

0.584**

1.000

Tangibility

-0.001

0.004

-0.176**

-0.037*

-0.072**

-0.087**

Ln(
Asset)

Total

Tangibili
ty

1.000

*, ** indicate correlation is significant at 10 per cent and 5 per cent respectively
Endogeneity Test:
Endogeneity is an issue that plagues most empirical pieces of research in corporate governance
(Börsch‐Supan & Köke, 2002). Davidson and MacKinnon (1995) suggested the Durbin–Wu–
Hausman (DWH) test for checking the endogeneity problem. The result of DWH indicates that
the null hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 10% level is rejected for Leverage (F (1, 2283)
=4440.69 Prob>F = 0.000), the results also show that Dividend is endogenous as well (F (1,
2282) = 1809.90 Prob>F = 0.000). Since the endogeneity problem is initially founded in this
study, then, OLS may lead to inconsistent and biased estimates in this study and using
simultaneous equations model (SEM) will be a suitable option to deal with the matter.
Model Identification Tests:
In order to identify a model, two conditions should be met. The first one is ‘order condition’ and
the second one is ‘rank condition’ (Wooldridge, 2012). The rank condition specifies whether the
structural equation which is being checked for identification can be distinguished from a linear
combination of all structural equations in the simultaneous equation system. The results show
that the model of study has rank conditions (based on checking the rank condition by Stata 13).
An equation satisfies the order condition of identification in a SEM, if the number of excluded
exogenous variables from the equation is at least as large as the number of endogenous righthand side variables in the equation (Wooldridge, 2012). Since in the equations of the model, the
number of excluded exogenous variables is greater than the number of endogenous variables,
therefore Sargan-Hansen test is needed to be applied for over identified restrictions. The results
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of the 3SLS model (Chi-sq= 0.040 ρ-value= 0.841) and 2SLS model (Chi-sq= 0.044 ρ-value=
0.834) show that the models are identified.
Comparison between 3SLS And 2SLS
Choosing between 3SLS and 2
is an important issue in this study. To resolve this problem,
this research conducted the Hausman specification (HS) test (Hausman, 1978), which examines
the specification of the system and would be performed on each equation separately. The test
chooses one equation in the model and compares 3SLS and 2SLS coefficients. If the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected, then the results of 3SLS are efficient and consistent and the result
of 2SLS is only consistent. But, if the null hypothesis is rejected, then the results of 3SLS
coefficients are inconsistent whereas the result of 2SLS is consistent. As shown in table 4, the
evaluation of debt/equity equation based on the 3SLS model is efficient compared to 2SLS
model, but their difference is negligible (χ 2(df=5) = 0.04 Prob>chi2 = 1.0000), although the
result of DPS equation indicates that the 3SLS and 2SLS are the same.
OLS Regressions Tests:
In the case of autocorrelation, the OLS results are not efficient. Durbin and Watson (1951) Test
is applied to check the autocorrelation problem for OLS regressions of leverage and dividends.
If, in each of the two OLS regressions, D value is smaller than the value of the lower bound, then
correlation exists. The results reveal that both equations have autocorrelation problems. That is,
D-Statistics for dividend and leverage are equal to d-statistic (5, 2289) = 0.6394524 and dstatistic (6, 2289) = 0.4230887, respectively.
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test is used to find out the potential Heteroskedasticity problem.
The results indicate that Dividend regression (chi2 (1) = 3359.85 Prob>chi2= 0.000) and
leverage regression (chi2 (1) =127.93 Prob>chi2= 0.000) have heteroskedasticity problem.
Therefore, the Newey–West standard errors will be used in order to obtain heteroskedasticity
and auto correlated consistent standard errors (Newey & West, 1986).
Result and Discussion of Leverage Equation:
Table 4 shows the findings of the 2SLS, 3SLS, and the OLS estimates for the leverage equation.
Considering the 2SLS and the 3SLS findings in Table 4, it can be observed that the coefficient of
DPS is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. However, the OLS indicates the reverse result
compared to the simultaneous equation models which shows the bias of OLS when DPS has an
endogenous variable in a model. This positive effect supports the entrenchment hypothesis of the
agency theory, free cash flow hypothesis of the agency theory, and Pecking Order Theory. It
means, based on the entrenchment hypothesis, although the dividend payout is increased,
managers try to use more debts to mitigate the remaining of the agency issue between themselves
and shareholders. On the other words, previous studies argued that dividend payout is rigid and
sticky among the listed firms in Bursa Malaysia (Ling et al., 2008) and when considering high
percentage of shareholding by managers (Mat Nor & Sulong, 2007), it can be understood why
paying more dividends is not enough to solve the agency conflict and managers have to use other
instruments (debt) to reduce the agency matter. In addition, according to the Agency Theory
managers try to solve the free cash flow matter by using more dividends; therefore they have
lack of internal sources for financing new projects and based on the Pecking Order Theory, they
have to use more debts. The finding is consistent with Persson (2014), Kim Ph et al. (2007) , but
inconsistent with Vo and Nguyen (2014), and Chen and Steiner (1999).
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Table 4 Results for the Leverage Equation
D.V.: Debt/Equity

OLS
(Newey)
-.5084***
(.0908)

2SLS

3SLS

19.0981***
(5.2610)

19.1582***
(5.24559)

Current Ratio

-.0396***
(.0029)

-.0958***
(.0185)

-.0958***
(.01849)

Tangible Asset

-.1198**
(.0571)

-.8921**
(.3179)

-.8807**
(.3124)

ROE

-.0027**
(.0013)

-.1041***
(.0276)

-.1044***
(.0275)

Reputation

.0080***
(.0018)

-.1195***
(.0350)

-.1200***
(.0349)

Cons

.5325***
(.0420)

2.4734***
(.5456)

2.4751***
(.5448)

DPS

2289
2289
2.1666
2.1701
5.84 ***
29.30***
χ
2(df=5)
= 0.04
Prob>chi2 =
1.0000
NOTE: ***, **, * Statistically significant at level 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. The OLS regression
applies Newey-West model standard errors. T statistic is presented within the parentheses.
Hausman specification test is performed for choosing between 2SLS and 3SLS based on
efficiency and consistency.
Observation Number
RMSE
F-value
χ2
Hausman Specification
Test between 2SLS and
3SLS

2289
49.64***
-

The negative coefficient of the current ratio variable is in line with the Pecking Order Theory
which explains that the internal resources have priorities compared to the external finance. The
results are also consistent with the argument which claims that, in the condition of high agency
costs of liquidity, outside creditors limit the amount of debt financing accessible to the firm. This
result is consistent with Persson (2014) and Kim Ph et al. (2007), but inconsistent with Ghosh
(2007). Unexpectedly, the tangible asset has a negative impact on leverage. However, the result
is in contrast with the theoretical literature, but it is mentioned that in the developing markets,
such as Poland (Mazur, 2007) and Pakistan (Sheikh & Wang, 2010). To explain this negative
effect, Mazur (2007) argues that in developing countries, because of the weak and inefficient
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regulatory, legal systems and secondary market, the firms cannot use tangible assets in an
efficient way; hence, an inverse relationship between tangible asset and leverage is predicted.
The significantly negative relationship between ROE and leverage is also supported by the
Pecking Order Theory. The results show that Malaysian listed companies may prefer the internal
source for financing new projects compared to loan borrowing. It means a company is able to
build up a remarkable amount of retained earnings as it makes profit during years; thus, there
would be no cause to seek external financing via debt (Abu Mouamer, 2011).
Moreover, the result is consistent with previous studies in the Malaysian context (Ahmad &
Aris, 2015; Suhaila et al., 2008). Table 4 also shows that the age of the firm has a significant
impact on leverage, implying that experienced firms may be more stable and have upper
internally generated funds in which they do not require external resources. Moreover, directors
of an old company are concerned with the company’s reputation and tend to avoid riskier
projects and act more prudently. This manner leads to reducing the debt financing in aged firms.
This result supports former findings by Ahmad and Aris (2015) in the Malaysian market.
Results and Discussion of Dividend Equation:
Table 5 shows the results of OLS (Newey-West), 2SLS, 3SLS associated with the dividend
equation of the model. The findings show that ρ-values and coefficients of variables in 2SLS and
3SLS are the same. As shown in the OLS column, the coefficient of Debt/Equity is -.0468
whereas the 3SLS shows a coefficient equal to -.346, indicating that SEM models present a
coefficient with 8 times more values compared to OLS regressions. More debts financing by the
firms lead to decreasing the amounts that could be paid to the shareholders. This negative effect
of leverage on dividends can be explained based on the effect of the installments. It means
shareholders are concerned about free cash flow (FCF); thus managers have to specify the FCF
to cover the Loan repayment obligations, and then the shareholders’ concern disappears. On the
other hand, benefits of debt holders might not be retained when huge amounts of dividends are
paid out. Thus, limitations in dividend payments can be found in debt covenants to alleviate this
problem. This finding also is in line with the convergence of interest hypothesis in which using
more debt leads to decreasing in dividend payout.
Moreover, the result is in contrast with the previous studies in Malaysia (Appannan & Sim,
2011; Ling et al., 2008), but it is in line with the findings of simultaneous equations studies by
Vo and Nguyen (2014) and Chen and Steiner (1999). In addition, the results indicate that the
current ratio has a negative effect on dividends that indicates a conservative decision making by
the Malaysian managers.
Additionally, increasing performance causes more payments on dividends to the shareholders
and this increase is consistent with the Agency Theory, indicating that shareholders expect
managers in highly profitable firms to pay out higher dividends in order to reduce the agency
costs. Indeed, the Agency Theory suggests that the payment of dividends reduces the FCF
available to the managers and attempts to minimize agency conflicts (Jensen, 1986).
Shareholders, therefore, expect managers of highly profitable firms to pay higher dividends in
order to reduce the agency costs (Li et al., 2007). This finding confirms previous studies in
Malaysia (Appannan & Sim, 2011; Ling et al., 2008).
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Expectedly, the size of the firm shows a significant positive effect on dividends, indicating that a
large company is more possible to be mature and also has an easier availability to the capital
market and could be able to pay more dividends. This finding is in line with the study by AlTwaijry (2007) in Malaysia.
Table 5 Results for the Dividend Equation
D.V.: DPS

OLS
(Newey)
-.0468***
(.0049)

2SLS

3SLS

-.3460***
(.0459)

-.3460 ***
(.0459)

Ln (Asset)

.0301***
(.0024)

-.0661***
(.0062)

.0661***
(.0062)

ROE

.0042***
(.0006)

.0021***
(.0005)

.0021 ***
(.0005)

Current Ratio

.0024***
(.0005)

-.0075***
(.0017)

-.0075***
(.0017)

Cons

-.3586***
(.0311)

-.6501***
(.5490)

-.6501***
(.0589)

Debt/Equity

2289
2289
.1731
.1730
74.57 ***
298.92 ***
χ
2(df=5) = 0.00
Prob>chi2 =
1.0000
NOTE: ***, **, * Statistically significant at level 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. The OLS regression
applies Newey-West model standard errors. T statistic is presented within the parentheses.
Hausman specification test is performed for choosing between 2SLS and 3SLS based on
efficiency and consistency.
Observation Number
RMSE
F-value
χ2
Hausman Specification
Test between 2SLS and
3SLS

2289
53.20***
-

CONCLUSIONS:
This paper examines the simultaneous determination of debt and dividends in Bursa Malaysia.
Like previous studies, this paper applies a simultaneous equation framework, which allows for
the possibility of determining the endogeneity of dividends and leverage.
This study also considers the entrenchment and the convergence of interests (COI) hypotheses
and their abilities to explain the dividends and leverage roles to decrease agency conflicts.

58

Ghasemi, Razak & Muhamud | Dividends, Leverage and Endogeneity Study in Bursa Malaysia

Moreover, this study confirms the notion that the entrenchment hypothesis and the COI
hypothesis cannot assume mutually exclusive.
The main results are as follows: (i) There are two-way relationships between leverage and
dividends, in which, leverage has a negative impact on dividends whereas dividend positively
affects leverage. (ii) These results show that listed firms use dividends and leverage to solve the
agency conflicts related to the free cash flow, although leverage and dividends are not mutually
exclusive in the Malaysian market. (iii) The results imply that shareholders and managers put
more emphasis on leverage to mitigate the free cash flow problem. (iv) Malaysian firms follow
the Pecking Order Theory in order to finance new projects.
Unlike most existing research, which utilizes ordinary least squares method and finds
inconclusive and sometimes contradictory results about the nature of these relationships, this
study shows that applying simultaneous equation models is justified and essential, since both
two variables reveal to be simultaneously determined.
The findings indicate that the results of 3SLS and 2SLS analyses are similar. However, based on
the OLS analysis, the results of the estimations between dividends and leverage are strongly
different from 3SLS and 2SLS. It means, in the leverage equation, both the sign and magnitude
for the coefficient of leverage are different from the results of 3SLS and 2SLS. In addition, in the
dividend equation, a large difference was found between the magnitude of the coefficients of
OLS and 3SLS. Therefore, 3SLS and 2SLS are empirically justified over the OLS due to the
large differences in the sign and magnitudes of the endogeneity. However, this study utilizes the
data on the listed companies in Bursa Malaysia; therefore, the findings may be limited to this
population. Future studies in this area may focus more on the two approaches; first, using other
econometric methods may be used as another way for proving these findings. Second, this study
used the total debt for calculating leverage. Hence, this study can be extended by investigating
the interrelationships between the short-term and long-term debts with dividends.
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